Abstract: The aim of the paper is to examine the limits of Aristotle and Arendt's contribution to a philosophical anthropology. By focusing on the concept of 'potentiality' -and thus the 'good life' as a potentiality awaiting actualization -the limit emerges from the way Aristotle understands 'life'.
1.
Life as understood by Aristotle bequeaths a number of problems. The one that is of direct concern in this instance is the relationship between 'life' and 'the good life.' How is such a distinction to be understood? What type of distinction is it? These questions are to be approached here initially in terms of the temporality of eudaimonia and thus, equally, of the position of the eudaimon. Once this position can be generalised it indicates the presence of a founding reciprocity between time, and the ontology of being a subject. This point arises in Arendt's engagement with Aristotle's use of Eudaimonia, at least in its first iteration here, is the predicate of a subject. 4 However, two issues arise here: the first concerns coming to live well and the production of the subject as the eudaimon and therefore secondly the problem of who is the subject of eudaimonia given that this subject position is produced. Here, the important point is that eudaimonia is the telos of life and thus that which orientates life. The formulation of this position in the Nichomachean Ethics is clear: 4 The good life, therefore, appearing as something final and selfsufficient, is the end to which all actions aim [τέλειον δή τι φαίνεται καὶ αὔταρκες ἡ εὐδαιμονία, τῶν πρακτῶν οὖσα τέλος]. 5 While the argument that life takes as its end the life that is lived properly (where the sense of propriety is set by life itself and is thus intrinsic to life, hence value is not external) and while it is also possible to identify the qualities of that life, the question that endures is on one level what occasions the move from life to 'the good life'; implicit in that demand however is another: namely, what would it mean here to participate in life?
The second question has to wait. In regards to the first, however, part of the answer depends upon the capacity of logos -understood as both reason and speech -to identify and thus to articulate the presence of this position.
What is proper to life is shown -'manifested' -by logos. Hence the claim in the Politics that, Logos makes manifest (shows) the beneficial and the harmful' [ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐπὶ τῷ δηλοῦν ἐστι τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ βλαβερόν]. 6 Recognizing that the 'beneficial' and the 'harmful' pertain to life in its unfolding, in other words they pertain to life in its being lived, means that, as a consequence, understanding the force of Aristotle's position hinges on what 'showing' or 'manifesting' mean in this instance. To argue that eudaimonia is the telos of life is to make the claim for which the following argument can be adduced: namely, that the ontology of being human has to be explained in terms of the living out of that which is proper to the being of being human. There can be therefore no founding separation of the ontological and the teleological. The latter is the former's unfolding.
Consequently, though it will be important to return to this point since what will emerge is the necessity to incorporate a founding division such that the distinction between potentiality and actuality marks an ontological divide, at this stage the founding interarticulation of the ontological and the teleological provides the framework within which to understand the famous 5 claim made in both the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics concerning the description of the being of being human: "the human, in terms of its being, And yet the problem of actualization will continue to haunt Aristotle's engagement with the complex relationship between potentiality and 'selfsufficiency.' Nonetheless, it is precisely the necessity of the founding ontological configuration and the inscription of the teleological within iteven knowing that actualization has an inevitable contingency -that guides the assessment of the lived life as 'the good life.' The guide emerges since life as lived cannot be separated either from this initial description of the being of being human, or from the necessity that the human life has to be lived out within the setting created by that which defines human being, namely the polis (the latter, again, as the place of human being). What logos makes clear therefore, or at least this would be the argument, is the current state of either individual or communal being as it is defined by the living out of the 'good life.'
Having created this setting the question that arises is the following:
What does it mean to claim that 'the good life' (εὐδαιμονία), working on the basis that it provides life with its telos, is 'self-sufficient' (αὔταρκες)?
(Given that this is the claim of Nichomachean Ethics 1098a8.) Taken more generally, what is at stake here can be understood as having a fundamental commensurability with the problem of actuality and thus of actualization (and then with the production of the subject as the eudaimon). If 'the good life' is a telos, and if it is recognized that 'the good life' is not an endpoint but is inextricably bound up with life as lived, then self-sufficiency becomes the possibility, where possibility and inevitability coincide, of the continual actualization of the telos of life. Within this setting the success of a life being 'the good life' is a proposition that can be assessed in terms of the criteria yielded by life as that which is -is what it is -in its being lived out.
In sum, it is only possible to be self-sufficient within a setting in which eudaimonia is 'self-sufficient.' 12 However, an addition needs to be made here since this position in the argumentation of the passage is immediately qualified. (A qualification that marks the introduction in the text of the 7 Nicomachean Ethics of the position noted above that human being is beingin-place.) The qualification is that 'self-sufficiency' does not pertain to a 'life lived in isolation' but to a life lived within a complex network of relations. This is the life afforded by logos. What then of the claim of 'selfsufficiency' knowing that it is not the project of any one individual subject, if that subject position were taken as an end in itself, but rather of a subject inscribed within the always already present set of relations that define human being as being-in-place and being-in-common? In other words, what arises once it has to be assumed that both place and commonality are at work? They produce the subject. As a result that subject then lives out that production as a placed entity. The slave is excised. The significant point here however is that the distinction within life in which the slave as alive does not 'participate' in life would itself have both secured and maintained by logos. It is in terms of logos that the slave comes to be described. Logos secures the distinction within life hence logos would have been essential to the production of the slave is aneu logon. As Arendt notes the slave is, deprived, of course, not of the faculty of speech, but of a way of life in which speech and only speech made sense and where the central concern of all citizens was to talk with each other. 21 Having a body the slave still speaks. And yet, of course, logos is that which serves to secure the slave's non-relation to logos. In other words, this means that logos cannot be taken as end in itself. And it is precisely this particular identification of the limit of logos that opens what might be called the problem of authority. Logos can no longer function as that which guarantees acts that have, or should have, a singular status. The consequence is that the ground of authority can no longer be assumed by that which is held in place by 'self-sufficiency' as secured by this specific instance of the temporality of at-the-same-timeness.
There is an additional point that needs to be made. The result of limiting logos in this way is that it undermines the possibility of 'selfsufficiency' if the latter is taken as a given rather than as produced. Once produced, of course, then 'self-sufficiency' is the after-effect of a founding site of difference, citizen/slave for example, that is itself the locus of an original differential of power. While a return will be made to the formulation concerning the interplay between the production of subject positions and power, it is essential in this regard to note the description of the slave as outside a life that takes place κατὰ προαίρεσιν namely, it occurs outside a life lived 'according to deliberation'. The consequence of such a position is that the slave cannot act virtuously in the strict sense of the term in which virtue is the result of deliberation. Hence, the slave cannot participate in the realm of deliberation and decision making that was itself regulated by logos. 22 As has been argued there is a structuring effect, namely the creation here of a position in which logos works to exclude the slave from relations that are defined by logos.
More generally therefore the claim is not that virtue and 'the good life' preclude any form of self-definition, it is rather that their actualization cannot be assumed since what restricts the actualization of that potentiality is external to the structure of self-sufficiency. If this is the case then a fundamental result of such a state of affairs is that the absence of a modal distinction between life and 'the good life' would then have to be taken up. 11 The actualization of 'the good life' now acquires a contingency that complicates in advance the nature of the interconnection between the ontological and the teleological. Indeed, the position to be sketched out in what follows is that the problem of contingency, in being recast, opens up the needs for an inscription of a genuine modal (now understood as both temporal and ontological) distinction between potentiality and actuality such that it is the structure of that distinction that will allow for a way of addressing the problem of authority that Arendt uncovers though which, it can be argued, her work is unable to resolve. It is essential to be precise here in terms of the limits of Aristotle. Arendt accepts, with justification, the identification of the being of being human with being-in-place, evidence for which is in part provided by a reformulation of Kant in which humans become "earthbound creatures." 23 However, the Aristotelian extension of this position is linked to a conception of 'self-sufficiency' that cannot be sustained for two reasons.
The first that it is a produced state and thus the link between selfsufficiency, eudaimonia and life is predicated on a setting in which the absence of that interconnection in the life of another, or the possibility of excluding them from it, means that the restriction of potentiality has an external ground that results in the refusal of self-sufficiency. The second reason for the impossibility of 'self-sufficiency' is that what modernity discovers -a discovery in which the moderns' predicament is itself disclosed -is that the possibility of deliberation that is central to Aristotle and which structured the move from 'life' to the 'good' life is no longer available if the locus of deliberation is taken to be a produced form of collectivity that is itself dependent upon modes of exclusion. Hence, the Aristotelian conceptions of being-in-place and being-in-common while formally correct come undone once there is a move from the formal determination to its determined and thus particular enactment or realization. To be effective therefore these conceptions have to remain immanent and thus are present as the ground of judgement. 'Self-sufficiency' as traditionally conceived precisely because it is produced cannot account for the inscription of power 12 into being-in-place; moreover, already present forms of relationality make the actualization of 'the good life' fundamentally more complex than had been first envisaged. Logos fails if it is positioned outside the realm of the differential. However, the Aristotelian point of departure which involves accepting a specific definition of the being of being human, and furthermore the interarticulation of ontology and teleology once recast in terms of the problem of how a potentiality is actualized rather than actualization having to be assumed, when taken together, provide a way ahead. There is a further point that can be made here. 'Self-sufficiency' is the predicate of a subject. As such it assumed the sovereignty of the Condition she notes that, the Romans, perhaps the most political people we have known, used the words "to live" and "to be among men" (inter homines esse) … as synonyms.
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The force of Arendt's position emerges once what is taken as central in the formulation 'inter homines esse' is the 'inter' rather than those between whom relationality obtains. Even though its initial formulation can be 13 located in Aristotle the locus of sovereignty has shifted fundamentally in this presentation of the move from Greece to Rome.
2.
Though its pathos would only ever emerge retrospectively, the closing lines of Arendt's The Jew as Pariah: A Hidden Tradition evince an acuity of thought whose registration is still to be taken up. Only within what she describes in that particular work as 'the framework of a people' is it possible to live as a human being without that being as human becoming exhausted in the process, remembering that for her Kafka's K dies 'exhausted.' 25 She concludes the text thus:
And only when a people lives and functions in consort with other peoples can it contribute to the establishment on earth of a commonly conditioned and commonly controlled humanity. 26 The terms guiding this conclusion are decisive. There is the possibility of acting in 'consort.' It is however only a possibility. Nonetheless, as a possibility it is able to maintain a specific identity. Her conclusion, what is occasioned however cannot be found in the pragmatic. There needs to be an ontological configuration in which 'dignity' is not a contingent predicate of human being. Rather, the claim has to be that dignity is coterminous with the being of being human. Here is the opening of the link to Aristotle, or at least the reiteration of the Aristotelian insistence that what is proper to human being has to be thought in terms of physis and thus in terms of the being of being human. And yet, and here is the move away from Aristotle, this is a moving away that takes his configuration of human being into the contemporary. This other move has to occur because dignity has become precarious. It is precisely not self-sufficient. Indeed, dignity can now be seen as having been precarious from the start. There is no necessity for the presence of dignity to be actualized as such. Humans enslave other humans. Humans impoverish other humans. In both instances participation in the life that holds open 'the good life' has a potentiality that has either been annulled or radically diminished. Within the Greek context slaves were denied human dignity precisely because of the separation of the slave from 'life.' They were denied the possibility of the actualization of that which is proper to human being i.e. being-in-place and being-in-common. The movement between them, the move from 'life' to 'the good life,' for Aristotle, is simply developmental. The slave, by definition, is excluded from the structure of the developmental itself.
It is within this context that slaves could not be seen as that which would have checked virtue's self-sufficiency. As has already been noted, slaves whilst human were not able to be virtuous in ways that linked them to life. They did not lead a life resulting from deliberation. This is the force of the formulation τοῦ ζῆν κατὰ προαίρεσιν, a formulation which identifies that from which they were excluded, deliberation itself, which is a setting where both logos and the inbuilt sense of relationality that it assumes remain integral elements. To deliberate is to act in accord with others. While the subject position is correct insofar as she names the worldliness of subjectivity, and thus there is the recognition that justice must be a quality of this world, it does not follow that the criteria of judgement are themselves worldly in the same way. The contention is that what is necessitated is a realm of transcendence. Transcendence describes the right that precedes the having of rights. Once it can be argued that this 'right' is commensurate with human dignity. The question to be taken up is how the non-necessity of its actualization is to be understood. Arendt demands that the unconditioned be thought. That is the predicament of thought itself.
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There is, in Aristotle, an already present recognition of the position in which a demand for judgment is linked to the transcendent or the immanent understood in terms of a both potentiality and the unconditioned, both of which are present in their separation from the actual. While a full account of the problem would necessitate locating this setup within the context created by the sustained treatment of potentiality in Metaphysics Θ, if only then to engage critically with that treatment, for these concerns in can be identified as at work in the account of 'political justice' in the Nicomachean Ethics. It is essential to be clear here. This is not to argue that the account of 'political justice' deploys the distinction between potentiality and actuality in any direct sense. Let alone that it establishes a connection or affinity between potentiality and the unconditioned. Rather, the claim is going to be that the nature of the difference within the realm of political justice between physis and nomos necessitates a reworking the potential/actual distinction in terms of a founding breach whose constitutive elements, in both their ontological as well as their temporal 24 determinations, pertain at-the-same-time and that all these individual elements would be necessary to account as much for the viability of the position as it would for tracing its implications. Aristotle's formulation is the following:
Political justice is of two kinds, one natural, the other conventional.
A rule of justice is natural that has the same force everywhere [τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ δικαίου τὸ μὲν φυσικόν ἐστι τὸ δὲ νομικόν, φυσικὸν μὲν τὸ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον δύναμιν].
44
The interpretive problem with which a start can be made concerns how the contrast between physis and nomos is to be understood. There is a genuine issue here, especially as there will be an enactment of justice on the level of nomos that is informed by physis rather than mere 'convention.' While there may be uses of physis that appear to operate within a modern opposition between 'nature' and 'culture,' the argument here is that such an interpolation is for the most part anachronistic. More significantly, however, such an interpolation would nullify the philosophical force inherent within the physis/nomos relation. What physis means in these instances is linked to the propriety of being. Hence the claim that has already been made, namely, that in the Politics the use of the term physis, in identifying human being as a polis dwelling animal -in other words, as having a life that is defined by the polis as place, what has been called being-in-place, a life that is always already with others -does not name a contingent predicate of human being. On the contrary, the claim is that being-in-place is intrinsic to the being of being human. It is this intrinsic quality that is identified and named by the term 'physis.' A similar form of argumentation occurs in the passage that has already been cited above from the Nicomachean Ethics. Here, again, the claim is that the distinction between physis and nomos is not a simple opposition. Indeed, the contrary is the case. As an opposition not only are two distinct ontological realms identified, the opposition has an operative and thus workful presence because it is temporalized in advance. It needs be understood, to deploy 25 Aristotle's own vocabulary, in terms of a sustained distinction between the 'immutable' (ἀκίνητον) and the 'variable.' The 'immutable' (ἀκίνητον), as that which is located in its opposition to the 'mutable,' has an ontological as well as a complex temporal determination. Intrinsic being is counter posed here to simple contingency and both pertain in their difference atthe-same-time.
Once the nature of these oppositions is settled another set of This is the position that has to be pursued. 26 Standing opposed to the pragmatic is therefore another understanding of the force of law. 46 And here it is of fundamental importance to note Aristotle's use of the term dynamis. It names force.
That which is 'immutable' has force. The condition of its having force is its immutability and thus the necessity of its separation from the domain of contingent actuality; the latter is the locus of the actual in its opposition to the setting named here as physis. The latter's actualization occurs as much in specific, local acts of judgment as it does in maintaining itself as held apart from the actual in terms of the yet-to-be determined quality of justice. A question arises here. It involves the formal problem of how the relation between the immutable and the mutable (the unconditioned and the conditioned) is to be understood. This is a speculative question, since it concerns the relation between these two domains. Moreover, it is a question that allows for the limit of Aristotle's thinking to be established insofar as the answer is always going to be that once content is given to that which is essential to 'political justice' -where the essential is understood both in terms of its immutability and the universality of its 'force' -then what occurs is the problem of moving from that which has unconditioned force to that which is inherently conditioned from the start. In other words, the structure in which 'political justice' is located stages, once again, the problem of moving from physis to nomos -recast now in terms of potentiality and actuality -such that the movement has to be understood as that actualization of the unconditioned which forms and is formed by the occurrence of indetermination. 'Self-sufficiency' would undo the possibility of physis functioning as a ground of judgment and yet, to return to the details of Aristotle's earlier formulations, the impossible possibility of 'selfsufficiency' means that it continues to create the setting that in the first place delimits the force of Aristotle and, in the second, opens both the way to Arendt and the emergence of the questions to which her thinking is constrained to respond. This is the predicament of her thought.
In the final lines of the Nicomachean Ethics, as a prelude to the identification of the necessity of writing a politics, Aristotle suggests that 27 what would have taken place once a treatise on the political had been written is that it would "bring to an end the philosophy of human affairs [ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια φιλοσοφία τελειωθῇ]" and therefore a philosophical anthropology would have been accomplished. 47 The contention here, perhaps also as a conclusion, is that it is in light of this formulation that what endures as central to an understanding of the being of being human emerges with greater clarity. While there is an opposition between the bios politikos and the bios theoretikos, in this instance not only will the former be privileged; the claim is that it is this sense of life that accords with 'human affairs' and in addition accords with the centrality that has been attributed to both being-in-place and being-in-common. More significantly, however, the bios politikos brings the centrality of relationality into play. The slave's actions and thus the slave's life were held in place; the place that was not, and more emphatically could never be, being-in-place.
Were the slave to move from life to 'the good life,' that move's condition of possibility would entail a cessation of the place of the slave. eudaimon is not 'happy' but is still flourishing as a result of the life that is led. 5 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1098a8. 6 Aristotle, Politics, 1253a, pp. 14-15. Continuum Books, 2010). 46 While it is not argued for in any detail, the following lines need to be understood as a repositioning of a concern with the 'force of law' that accepts Derrida's point of departure and then attempts to reposition it in terms of being-in-place and being-in-common. In regards to Derrida see his
Force de loi (Paris: Galilée, 2005). 47 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1181b15. 48 The clear point here is that the move from life to 'the good life' is a form of development that naturalized chronological time. Hence it is not the structure of time within which the slave's dignity -the dignity that slave 
